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ABSTRACT
The paper identifies trusting problems between autonomous
services in the Internet-of-Services (IoS). This scenario vi-
sion describes a general computational paradigm, which al-
lows companies to procure computational resources exter-
nally. The arising conflicting interests between providers
and consumers lead to strategic behaviour of single services.
Usually trust and reputation models are proposed to set in-
centives for acting honestly. But when using Double Auc-
tions to match buyers and sellers, these trust and reputation
models fail to close this “trusting gap”. This paper proposes
a modified Double Auction protocol fulfilling the deducted
requirements. Simulation experiments show that the usage
of this modified protocol leads to increased trustworthiness
for the participants.
1. INTRODUCTION
The increasing dynamic of markets leads for companies to
the need of adapting their processes to continuously chang-
ing environment. For every-day business, the use of compu-
tationally intensive information technology (IT) seems es-
sential to implement new flexible business models within a
short time.
The Internet-of-Services (IoS) describes a general computa-
tional paradigm, which allows companies to procure compu-
tational resources externally and thus to save both internal
capital expenditures and operational costs. The notion of
Internet-of-Services follows the idea of consuming different
services externally, provided by distinct Service Providers
(SP), but from a blurred cloud of resources within a single
business unit or even between different businesses [10]. As
the interaction frequency is assumed to be very high and
the volume of a single interaction is assumed to be very
small, the whole process has to be fulfilled without human
interaction. The process includes finding a suitable SP, ne-
gotiating with it, invoking the service and fulfilling some
post-processing steps if necessary.
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To match providers and consumers, an efficient allocation
mechanism between service demand and supply is needed:
a market [28]. But introducing a market will lead to other
problems, for example asymmetrically distributed informa-
tion between SPs and consumers. SPs usually have more
information about quality or availability of the services they
provide, than Service Consumers (SC). Further, the effec-
tively provided functionality might differ from the promised
functionality. This case of asymmetrically distributed infor-
mation usually leads to suboptimal results due to the uncer-
tainty on the consumer side, and thus to an inferior usage
of the service environment in total. Contrarily, consumers
have more information about their liquidity. In addition,
both interaction participants deal with uncertainty caused
by environmental factors (for example network failures).
One common way to overcome this asymmetrical informa-
tion distribution is the usage of trust and reputation mod-
els [13]. The own experiences, experiences from other par-
ticipants or just gossiping received from other participants
about a target service can influence one’s behaviour. The
usage of trust and reputation models is quite common in de-
centralized environments, because no central entity has to
be implemented that has central knowledge or even central
control.
From Electronic Commerce research different payment mod-
els are “known”: the pay-before model determines the pay-
ment before a service invocation takes place, the pay-later
model works vice versa. The choice of the payment model
directly impairs the direction of the aforementioned asym-
metrical information distribution. These models are also
assumed for IoS.
This paper will especially focus on the usage of Double Auc-
tions to coordinate a future IoS. Coordinating sellers and
buyers by a Double Auction means, that there is a central
Auctioneer that receives the bids of sellers and buyers. The
Auctioneer matches these bids following a known algorithm,
which determines the price [22]. Following Streitberger et
al. [28], a Double Auction represents an efficent mechanism
to coordinate resource allocation in service systems.
With this paper we are going to investigate the question if it
is possible to use reputation information in order to achieve
trustworthy interactions in a Double Auction-coordinated
IoS environment. Therefore, the paper is structured as fol-
lows: whereas section 2 presents foundations and related
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work for this paper, section 3 explains the proposed design
of the Double Auction protocol. Section 4 demonstrates
and evaluates the proposed protocol in combination with
the AV ALANCHEdec reputation model. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper and presents future work.
2. FOUNDATIONS AND RELATED WORK
This section presents foundations of the work and related
work. Foundations can be split into the AVALANCHE rep-
utation model, requirements and hypotheses on Double Auc-
tions that are deducted from literature. Related work com-
prises papers regarding trusting relationships between the
actors Seller, Buyer and Auctioneer.
2.1 AVALANCHE Reputation System
Trust and reputation models have been discussed in research
extensively in the past (see for example [25]). Due to the
simple requirements a reputation model has to fulfil as soon
as it is assumed that no cognitive acting humans are directly
involved, we chose a simple mathematical model to discuss
the usage in Double Auctions: “AVALANCHE”. Discussing
the generalizability of the findings for other models will be
not part of this paper.
Padovan et al. [19, 20], the authors of the AVALANCHE
system, denote their reputation coefficient as RXY , whereas
X denotes the identity of the rating software agent (Evalu-
ator), and Y denotes the identity of the rated agent (Tar-
get). The reputation coefficient obtains values in between
0 ≤ RXY ≤ 1. RXY = 1 denotes the best reputation (tar-
get agent seems to be a reliable agent), RXY = 0 denotes a
bad reputation (target seems to be non-cooperative). Per
se the reputation coefficient represents a private value for
each agent, such that two different agents might differ in
their coefficient about target agent three: R13 = R23. “In
general, the reputation coefficient is used to adapt the soft-
ware agent’s negotiation strategy according to its partner’s
expected cooperative behaviour.” [19, p. 6]
To structure the trust and reputation mechanism, Padovan
et al. distinguish four stages: obtaining the reputation coef-
ficient, adapting this coefficient to the own negotiation strat-
egy, rating the partner’s behaviour after the transaction and
last but not least the distribution of the reputation informa-
tion.
2.1.1 Obtaining Reputation Information
Within the obtaining stage, Padovan et al. [20] identify
three different cases: The target agent is unknown for all
agents. In this case the agent has to estimate the risk of an
interaction with the target. To do that, the authors propose
as an alternative to a default value between 0 and 1 the av-
erage value of all known reputation values. If no reputation
value is available (first interaction), a default value has to
be chosen.
If the agent has already made personal experiences with the
target, the agent can use its personal own information about
the target’s cooperative behaviour and eventually take fur-
ther information from others, for example if this information
is not reliable.
Table 1: Assessment of price and reputation [19]
I Yi pi R
X
Yi
2−RXYi p∗i rank
1 12 47 RX12 = 0.63 1.37 64.39 2
2 3 52 RX3 = 0.65 1.35 70.20 3
3 16 54 RX16 = 0.85 1.15 62.10 1
4 5 56 RX5 = 0.44 1.56 87.36 4
2.1.2 Adapting Reputation Information to Negotia-
tion Strategies
At the beginning of the negotiation phase (after the infor-
mation phase) the agent has received a list of potential inter-
action partners. These offers and the corresponding agents
are ranked in by an assessed offer price p∗Yi that is calculated
based on the initial offered price pYi and its reputation co-
efficient RXYi : p
∗
Yi
= pYi + (R
X
Yi
∗ 0 + (1 − RXYi) ∗ pYi) =
pYi ∗ (2−RXYi)
Table 1 illustrates one example with four offers. The agent
X starts to negotiate with partner number 16. If this nego-
tiation fails, X will negotiate with number 12 [19].
2.1.3 Rating Cooperative Behaviour
After each settlement phase of a transaction, the agents are
able to rate each other. This value is denoted by the authors
with rj , whereas j represents the index of the transaction.
Successful transactions are rated with rj = 1 (best value),
unsuccessful transaction are rated with rj = 0 (worst value)
[19].
2.1.4 Distribution and Updating
This obtained rating value rj updates the reputation coef-
ficients of the involved transaction partners X and Y . To
emphasis latest ratings compared to older ones, the authors
use an average weighting calculation with a weighting factor
α. This weighting factor can be instantiated by the agent
owner. Following, the new reputation value is calculated as
follows: RXYi = R
X
Yi−1 ∗ (1− α) + rj ∗ α. If a global reputa-
tion agency is used (centralized model), a global value for α
has to be defined. Based on the assumptions on future IoS
environments we avoid using a central unit that coordinates
the reputation values.
The main difference of a decentralized to a centralized repu-
tation mechanism is not the concept itself. Instead the pro-
cess of exchanging reputation information increases in its
complexity. While in a centralized model, as AVALANCHE
represents one, the reputation unit manages all published
reputation information, in a decentralized model neighboured
agents have to be requested for information on other partic-
ipants. Each participant has to manage reputation informa-
tion for its own. In order to extend the initial AVALANCHE
model to the decentralized version AV ALANCHEdec, we
just have to modify the reputation communication process.
For the remaining paper, we are assuming the decentralized
version of the reputation model. That model has been vali-
dated against the original model within the SimIS [15] envi-
ronment before conducting the simulation experiments. The
used replication methodology follows the replication replica-
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tion process model of Sansores and Pavon [27] and bases on
experiments and corresponding simulation data of [19]. The
result of this replication has been positive.
2.2 Hypotheses on Double Auctions and Rep-
utation Usage
In order to define the requirements for the research artifact
[12], we will present the hypotheses that have been deducted
from literature review in Ko¨nig et al. [16] (see table 2). The
table combines the negotiation roles Service Provider (SP),
Service Consumer (SC) and Auctioneer (Auct.) with the two
possible payment models pay-before and pay-later. Using
one of the two payment models determines whether the SC
or the SP role acts as trustee (has cheating possibility).
Agents acting strategically regarding the reputation model
usage might have different interests regarding the process of
generating and distributing ratings. This includes the rat-
ing of target agents and the memetic acting, that means
participating in gossiping. This subsection considers the
overlapping of the reputation roles describing the agents’
participation in the overall reputation process.
In their work, Conte and Paolucci [11] define the four differ-
ent agent roles as follows:
• The set M is a group of agents that sends information
to other agents.
• Set E are all agents which evaluate a certain target T.
• Set T, on the other side, are the agents which are eval-
uated by E.
• Finally, set B is defined as a group of beneficiaries that
benefit from the evaluations performed by the evalu-
ators (set E) about the targets (set T ) that can be
spread through the memetic agents (set M ). The ben-
eficiaries benefit from it as they receive information
about the degree to which the target conforms with
the social norm. [11, p. 74 et seqq.]
As soon as two or more roles overlap, certain effects regard-
ing the reputation model can occur [11]. For us, especially
two hypotheses are of interest:
H1: B  E,B∩T = E∩T = ∅: The overlapping of the sets
B and E and the non-overlapping of T lead to working
reputation system, because participants are motivated
to provide their own experiences, the reputation sys-
tem works well.
H2: B ∩ T,B ∩ E = E ∩ T = ∅: As soon as all sets are
disjunctive from each other, the participants have no
incentives to participate at the reputation system.
Even if we implement a model like AV ALANCHEdec, it is
not possible to gain an adequate system when using Double
Auctions. The problem in this case is that neither the SC
nor the SP are fulfilling the Beneficiary role. Instead, only
the Auctioneer in terms of a Double Auction might benefit
from correct ratings due to a higher fulfilment of its users’
expectations.
Table 2: Reputational Configurations in Double Auctions
(following [16])
Negot. Trustee SP SC Auct. H1 H2
DA
SP T E B No Yes
SC E T B No Yes
DARep
SP T E,B Yes No
SC E,B T Yes No
2.3 Requirements on Trustworthy Double Auc-
tions in the IoS
The mechanism this work is going to design and develop
should focus on the trust relation between the set of buyers
and the set of sellers. In addition, the coordination mecha-
nism should be denoted by a Double Auction.
R 0 The mechanism to design must focus on the trusting
relationship between the set of sellers and the set of
buyers. Further, a Double Auction mechanism has to
be used in order to fill the identified research gap.
In order to reach H1 instead of H2, we have do find a con-
figuration of the Double Auction protocol that shifts the B
role (Beneficiary) from the Auctioneer to the SC in the pay-
before case and respectively to the SP in the pay-later case
(see table 2). If it is possible to design such a mechanism,
the trustor can use reputation information in order to choose
negotiation partners. For the trustee on the other hand, this
information is not important as it can not be cheated during
the interaction. We will hold this requirement as following:
R 1 The trustor must be able to use its information on the
reliability of the matched partner or the partner to
match in order to benefit from this information.
In order to design the mechanism as flexible as possible, it
should be resistant against a change in the payment model.
This means that a change of the payment model from pay-
later to pay-before should have no effect on the system and
vice versa. If the mechanism would be able to fulfil this
requirement, a change of the payment model would not de-
termine major changes in mechanism design. Further, the
required flexibility regarding the trustor-trustee relationship
will enable a pay-later or a pay-before or even an arbitrary
combination of both models.
R 2 The protocol to be designed should work in a sym-
metric way in order to stay flexible to changes in the
trustee-trustor relationship. This change can be deter-
mined by the change of the payment model.
The Auctioneer has to follow clear rules in order not to
adulterate the economic outcome of the matching process.
That is, the decision for matching a SC and a SP should
be made by each side based on the reliability, which is in-
dicated by the available trust and reputation information.
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The decision should not be possible based on price informa-
tion. More concrete, as soon as SP and SC are matched,
each side should be able to refuse the partner based on its
information on the former behaviour and not on the price.
R 3 SP and SC must be able to decide on the acceptance of
an offer based on the former behaviour of the opponent
and not based on the price of the matching (see for
example [34])
2.4 Trusting Relationships between Auction-
eer, Seller and Buyer
Within this subsection, we are going to consider approaches
that regard the trusting relations between the Auctioneer,
the set of sellers and the set of buyers. Figure 1 illustrates
the three different emerging trusting relationships [30].
Seller Buyer
Auctioneer
Trusting Auctioneer
Securing Bidding
Trustworthy
Interacting
Trustworthy
Competing
Trustworthy
Competing
Figure 1: Classification of Competing Approaches, in anal-
ogy to [30, p. 145]
The first category regards the trusting relationship between
the role of an Auctioneer and the role of bidders. Bidders
can be divided into the set of sellers and the set of buyers.
These groups are integrated to the group of bidders due to
the fact that the trust relation does not differ between the
set of sellers and the set of buyers.
Franklin and Reiter [14] mention in their work some of the
most important challenges when designing electronic auc-
tions with an Auctioneer instance: the Auctioneer can in-
form a collaborator regarding submitted bids, the closing
time could be manipulated, such that interested bidders
are not able to submit their intended bids, the Auction-
eer could accept bids after the closing time, the Auctioneer
could award the auction to another bidder than the winning
bidder, the Auctioneer could collect money from the non-
winning bidders and finally the winner could refuse to pay
to the Auctioneer [14].
The same authors propose a mechanism for sealed bid auc-
tions that ensures that bids are not revealed until the bid-
ding period has been ended, the Auctioneer collects the
money for the service from the winner. All other bidders are
ensured that they do not have to pay and only the winner
is able to consume the negotiated service [14]. Franklin and
Reiter ensure this by the usage of cryptographic techniques.
Brandt [4] specifies this approach for Vickrey Auctions. In
second price auctions the Auctioneer has an additional cheat-
ing opportunity. It could increase the second-highest bid in
order to increase the effective price the winner has to pay.
The mechanism of Brandt [4] considers especially the high-
est and the second price in Vickrey Auctions. Later, the
same author proposes a mechanism in which the Auctioneer
becomes obsolete as the bids are shared on all bidders [5].
This might solve the trusting problem between Auctioneer
and bidders. Brandt [6] also proposes a mechanism for the
(M+1)st price mechanism that is also used here in this pa-
per. The author proposes a technique based on the El Gam-
mal encryption. Following this mechanism, a trusted third
party can substitute the trusting relationship between bid-
ders and Auctioneer. A similar approach has been proposed
by Baudron et al. [2]. An overview of cryptographic ap-
proaches without a trusted third party is given by Bogetoft
et al. [3]. Wang [31] considers the problem of anonymity
in Continuous Double Auctions and the traceability of false
offers in this kind of Double Auctions.
The next category of trust relationships goes beyond the
analysis of Turel and Yuan [30] (see figure 1). It is the
trust relationship between participants within the groups of
seller or buyers. Brandt and Weiss [7] name participants,
which behave in a fashion that they reduce the profit of
competitors, “antisocial” agents. These agents follow this
goal beside the goal of maximizing the own profit. Follow-
ing Brandt and Weiss, these agents“need to deviate from the
dominant truth-telling strategy” [7, p. 335]. Among other
researchers, Sandholm [26] adresses the problem of truth-
bidding by the usage of the Clarke-Groves pricing mecha-
nism, a generalized Vickrey auction. Zhou and Zheng gen-
eralize the truth-bidding for Double Auctions in their frame-
work, called TRUST [34].
Finally, we are going to consider the category that represents
the focus of this work: the trust relationship between the
both bidder groups: seller (SP) and buyer (SC). This prob-
lem has been identified and examined by Braynov and Sand-
holm [8]. In a subsequent work the same authors address,
beyond others, this problem [9], but use a single-sided Vick-
rey auction (in our terms: Auction) to solve this problem.
Ramchurn [23] proposes a mechanism to ensure a trusted re-
lation between sellers and buyers, but he also makes use of
single-sided auctions. Tafreschi et al. [29] assume the same
problem. But within their proposal to solve this problem
they make use of a Fixed Price Auction protocol.
Summarizing, we can state that none of the existing ap-
proaches focuses the trusting relation between sellers and
buyers within a Double Auction. They fail to meet require-
ment R0. We will now propose a design that allows to ad-
dress the trusting problem within Double Auctions. There-
fore, the Negotiation Protocol module has to be modified
and the interface for agents to make decisions has to be de-
signed.
3. DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
Following the Design Science process of Peffers et al. [21],
the protocol is now designed. But before describing the re-
sults of this process in this paper, we will consider the un-
derlying assumptions.
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3.1 Assumptions and Simulation Environment
The approach assumes that participants might defect the
system through not answering the service or payment re-
quests not as expected. The Matcher, instead, is assumed
to always act honestly. Keeping related work in mind, this
assumption could be dropped in future. Further, no trusted
third party for example to fulfil the payment process is avail-
able. Finally, the decision, if a trustee is playing honest or
fraudulent, is modeled as a binary decision, that is the ser-
vices can be clearly divided into honest and cheating ser-
vices.
3.2 Protocol
In order to meet the requirements, the Double Auction pro-
tocol has to be re-designed. In this approach, the Matcher
makes use of the (M+1)st price rule. The (M+1)st price rule
sets the clearing price (the price buyers have to pay and sup-
pliers earn) at the (M+1)st highest price of all bids [33]. For
reasons of simplicity, the focus of the protocol will lie on the
matched participants only: in case of the unmatched bidder,
the Matcher sends a “Lost”message to the set of unmatched
SPs and the set of unmatched SCs. For these participants
the current Double Auction round is finished without suc-
cess. In this case no trusting relationship occurs due to the
failed attempt to find a suitable partner (to consume or to
provide a service).
The protocol proposal is illustrated in figure 2 in terms of
an UML sequence diagram. The process starts with an an-
nouncement of a new Auction round by the Matcher. Send-
ing this broadcast message simplifies the service discovery
process that is also a necessary part of the service life cy-
cle. The process of how to find a service that promises the
desired functionality is assumed to work. That means that
the functionality can be exactly described with underlying
service descriptions and the Matcher will only match with
SPs and SCs that have equal service or demand descriptions.
Within the following simulation the service is denoted by a
textual string that represents the unique service and demand
description.
The negotiation process starts with the aforementioned Call-
for-Bids message that is sent by a broadcast message deliv-
ery to all participants. As soon as the SP has resources
available to offer, it will answer this Call-for-Bids message
with a Sell message. Symmetrically, the SC answers in case
of an open demand the Call-for-Bids message with a Buy
message. Both answer messages have to include the price
for the proposal. For the SP the price denotes the lowest
bid on which it will provide the service. For the SC on the
other side, the price denotes the maximum price it is willing
to pay for the service.
The Matcher follows the (M+1)st price matching algorithm
[33] and stores the proposals in the corresponding proposal
sets. In periodic matching proceedings, the proposals are
matched regarding the (M+1)st price matching and price
determination rule.
The matched services and demands instead, are notified by a
Ask-if-Opp-Is-Ok message. This message includes the name
of the matched opponent. The message does not include the
(M+1)st price, such that no economic side effects can occur,
Figure 2: Modified Double Auction Protocol
i.e. refusing the matching due to the high or low price.
The Matcher stores the matched pairs in a new data struc-
ture. This data structure is able to store additional flags
for each participant that denotes the fact if the correspond-
ing agent has already confirmed the matching. The decision
whether to confirm the matching or not, can be made by
each agent on individual preferences: if the matched agent is
sufficienty trustworthy, the matching is accepted, otherwise
it is rejected. This decision point represents the interface to
a potential usage of a trust and/or reputation mechanism
to confirm the decision with more information, here on his-
toric behaviour of the service or participant. The individual
preference is modelled by an individual threshold that de-
termines this decision.
As soon as the matched SP and the corresponding SC ac-
cepted the matching and announced this with an ACK mes-
sage to the Matcher, the Matcher sends the final Sold mes-
sage to both sides. This message includes the price on which
offer and demand have been matched. At this point the
agent can influence its future personal strategy regarding
the negotiation itself and can increase or decrease its esti-
mated market price.
4. DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION
4.1 Simulation Environment
In order to evaluate the mechanism later, we have to intro-
duce a simulation environment, called SimIS [15], that fol-
lows the IoS vision. This system is able to model Internet-
like networks where the nodes are hosting active services.
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Application Layer
Infrastructure Layer
Figure 3: SimIS Architecture [15]
The messages follow the SOAP messages structure and the
service interfaces follow real-world Web Services technology,
like discussed in Lee and Winslett [17]. These interfaces
conform to the widle-used interaction protocols in service
economies.
4.1.1 Technological Base: Repast Toolkit
The SimIS1 toolkit was implemented as an extension to the
Recursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit [24], developed
at the Argonne National Lab, Chicago. Repast is a free and
open source agent-based modelling toolkit [18]. This foun-
dation was chosen due to its comprehensive API, the very
generic and easy to use set of data gathering and analysis
functions as well as the support for network modelling (in-
cluding respective programming libraries). Technically, the
current version of SimIS is based on Repast Symphony and is
completely implemented in the Java programming language.
4.1.2 SimIS Architecture
In order to map the abstract IoS architecture to our simu-
lation model a two-tiered architecture for SimIS seems suit-
able. The overall system is thus divided into an Application
Layer and an Infrastructure Layer. An overview of the over-
all architecture is illustrated in Figure 3.
The Infrastructure Layer models topological settings of the
IoS. The basic idea is that all Application Layer Agents or
Services are linked to a single Infrastructure Agent each,
which is representing their server platform. This platform
is therefore responsible for sending messages to other Appli-
cation Layer Agents (including routing and communication
patterns, such as broad- or multicast), and receiving mes-
sages from other Infrastructure Agents and passing them on
to either other Infrastructure Agents (in case the agent rep-
resents only the next step on the message’s route) or to one
or more Application Layer Agents associated with it (in case
these are the recipients) [15].
Within the Application Layer the actual services of the IoS
vision are modelled. Basically the underlying Infrastruc-
ture Layer provides us with a high-enough flexibility for im-
plementing any service logic in terms of Application Layer
Agents communicating via the offered message objects and
routing functionality. Each service (Application Layer Agent)
is implemented as a plain Java class and can therefore ex-
ploit the full potential this programming language offers in
addition to the libraries present within the SimIS toolkit.
4.2 Simulation Experiments
4.2.1 Simulation Scenario
1For more information see http://simis.sourceforge.net
As just mentioned, the topology will again be divided into an
Infrastructure Layer consisting of nodes and edges between
them, and an Application Layer. The network used for sim-
ulation experiments consists of 100 nodes that are connected
not heavy-weighted and not long-tailed. The mean distance
between the nodes is about 3.26 with an maximum distance
between two nodes of six hops.
For the following simulation experiments, 200 SP agents and
200 SC agents will be deployed at the beginning of the sim-
ulation experiment. In order to introduce dynamics, partic-
ipants are substituted by newcomers during the simulation
experiments. The time range for the substitution process
is set to a value that in average the complete population of
agents is replaced once during one simulation experiment of
100,000 time ticks. Depending on the payment model 10%
SP cheaters or 10% SC cheaters are deployed. This rate
might fluctuate due to the dynamic character of the system.
For each simulation setting, the products that are negoti-
ated are fixed by a certain functional attribute definition.
This attribute combination is assumed to be defined by an
underlying service description. The one and only attribute
that is negotiated is denoted by the price. The negotiation
protocol is determined by a (M+1)st price Double Auction.
4.2.2 Metrics
As the simulation scenario has been defined, the metrics for
the simulation experiments are introduced now. The fulfil-
ment rate and the negotiation rate are plotted in dependence
of the simulation time.
The concrete implementation of the fulfilment depends on
the payment model of the simulation experiment. If the ser-
vice has to be payed in advance, the fulfilment rate considers
the service fulfilment: fr =
∑|SCs|
i
servicesreceivedi
services
paid
i
. For each
participant the rate of successful services against failed ser-
vices are noted. Without any reputation system, one would
expect that the service fulfilment rate corresponds to the
rate of cheaters in the system. If the service has to be payed
after it has been fulfilled, the fulfilment rate considers the
payment fulfilment. Then, for each SP the rate of successful
payments against failed payments are plotted over time.
The negotiation rate is defined very close to the fulfilment
rate. While the latter focuses on the service and payment
fulfilment, the negotiation rate focuses on the rate of nego-
tiation processes that have been finsihed successfully: nr =
∑|SCs|
i
negotiation
finished
i
negotiationstartedi
. The outcome of the fulfilment af-
terwards is not relevant for this metric. In a system with a
well-working reputation system the negotiation rate of de-
fecting agents will fall down as soon as they are identified,
and the other participants will not be willing to negotiate
with them any more. If the trust and reputation system does
not work properly, the rates might not differ at all between
honest and cheating participants. The definition when a ne-
gotiation begins, depends on the negotiation protocol: in a
Double Auction as soon as a bidder submits a bid to the
Auctioneer is assumed as the negotiation start.
Finally a metric that covers indicators that base on the ne-
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(b) Fulfilment Rate (pay-before)
Figure 4: Double Auction Fulfilment Rate
gotiation and trustworthiness will be introduced: fairness.
While the negotiation and fulfilment rate will be plotted
over time, this metric will analyse the agent population at
the end of each experiment. When plotting the investments
or revenues against the amount of services, fairness can be
defined in a distribution close to the bisecting line (assum-
ing similar valuations) [32]. The gradient of the bisecting
line is determined by the valuation. To ensure the appli-
cability of this metric in both trustor/trustee relationships,
we will evaluate the deviation of a population by the root
mean square deviation to the expected bisecting line. A de-
viation value of 0 for the whole polulation would denote a
complete “fair” system, whereas a high deviation value de-
notes an “unfair” system. The deviation is calculated by the
root mean square error that measures the differences of the
measured values against the expected (fair) values.
4.2.3 Simulation Results
In the following simulations each single experiment is re-
peated for 30 times using different random valuations and
makes use of the modified Double Auction Protocol. With
30 replications and uniformly distributed input parameters,
the simulation experiments are expected to satisfy common
statistical requirements. During the data analysis the 0.95
confidence interval of the time series are taken for further
analysis. The simulation outcome is further compared to
the case that uses the initial Double Auction protocol. In
both cases, AV ALANCHEdec is used as decentralized trust
and reputation model for all participants (SPs and SCs).
Figure 4 illustrates the overall fulfilment rate of the sce-
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Figure 5: Negotiation Rates in modified Double Auction
nario’s simulation experiments. The figure denotes the pay-
ment fulfilment in the pay-later and the service fulfilment
in the pay-before model. As we have again 10% of cheating
agents, the fulfilment rate is expected at about 90%. As we
have seen above, the reference case (initial Double Auction
protocol) fulfils the expectation with a constant fulfilment
rate of about 90% (dark area).
The grey areas illustrate the service or payment fulfilment
rates when using AV ALANCHEdec, combined with the
modified protocol. The service fulfilment rate increases sig-
nificantly compared to the simulation outcome with the ini-
tial Double Auction protocol. Both payment models lead to
analogous results.
A value of approximated 100% is unrealistic due to the fol-
lowing reasons: during the settlement phase of the simula-
tion run the reputation system has to be filled with infor-
mation. Within this settlement phase some interactions fail,
such that the rate can not reach the 100% value. Further,
during the simulation runs the implemented dynamics lead
to a continuous arrival of unknown agents.
As we stated above, a working reputation system has to
lead to a spreading of negotiation rates between honest and
dishonest participants. Figure 5 illustrates the negotiation
rates when using the initial or the modified Double Auction
protocol. Subfigure 5a considers the pay-later case where
the SCs are acting as trustees. Determined by the payment
model, these agents are able to cheat the corresponding SPs.
Following, with a well-working trust and reputation model
the negotiation rate of cheating and honestly acting SCs
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Figure 6: Fairness between Service Providers in Double Auc-
tions (pay-later)
should spread.
The initial Double Auction protocol does not differentiate
regarding the negotiation rate between honest and dishon-
est SCs. As soon as we implement the modified Double
Auction protocol, the negotiation rate of dishonest SCs de-
creases over time and spreads compared to the rate of hon-
est SCs (dark area vs. light grey area). This case (modified
Double Auction, pay-later and AV ALANCHEdec) is now a
well-working case regarding the trustworthiness.
The pay-before case is illustrated in figure 5b. Like in the
pay-later case, an implementation of the modified protocol
leads to a spreading of negotiation rates. Honest SPs, which
represent the trustees now, are more often able to finish a
negotiation process compared to cheating SPs (dark area vs.
light grey area). As soon as the initial Double Auction pro-
tocol is used to coordinate the services, the negotiation rates
of both SP groups do not differ at all. Demand and supply
are not balanced in the scenario, such that the negotiation
rates differ between SC and SP.
Figures 6 and 7 will now consider the fairness metric when
coordinating the services in an IoS environment by the dif-
ferent Double Auction protocols.
Based on the findings before, figure 6a denotes a well-working
combination of the modified Double Auction protocol with
the pay-later payment model and AV ALANCHEdec as rep-
utation model. This combination leads to less negotiations
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Figure 7: Fairness between Complex Service Agents in Dou-
ble Auctions (pay-before)
with fraudsters involved. In consequence, a smaller amount
of SPs are cheated. The root mean square error to the
expected bisection (completely fair system) is denoted by
22.27.
Figure 6b illustrates the result of the same experiment, but
with the initial Double Auction protocol. Compared to the
simulation experiment with usage of the modified specifica-
tion, we can immediately see that the reputation information
of AV ALANCHEdec does not influence the results. SPs re-
ceive less money in relation to the services they delivered.
These cheated agents can be found above this imaginary
bisection. The root mean squared error in this case is with
145.9 higher than in the same experiment using the extended
protocol version.
Based on the findings before, figure 7a illustrates the second
well-working combination of the modified Double Auction
protocol: this time with the pay-later model. Here, the
usage of AV ALANCHEdec leads to less negotiations with
fraudsters involved. In consequence, a smaller amount of
SPs are cheated. The root mean square error to the desired
bisection is denoted by 20.01. If we use the initial approach
in the pay-before case, the simulation outcome decreases in
its fairness metrics (see figure 7b). The simulation experi-
ment leads to a root mean squared error of 149.1.
Additional sensitivity analyses show that the model is very
robust against changes in the cheaters rate (up to about
40%) and regarding the amount of services (with more than
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50 SPs and SCs). Running simulations for 100,000 ticks en-
sures that stable system states are reached. Neither increas-
ing the simulation duration, nor changing the reputation
model (for example by using the proposal by Abdul-Rahman
[1]) affect the simulation outcomes.
Summarizing the results of the modified Double Auction ex-
periments, we can state that both initial hypotheses regard-
ing the Double-sided Auction can be confirmed: when using
the original Double Auction protocol, the instantiation of
AV ALANCHEdec does not increase the trustworthiness of
the system compared to the expected trustworthiness based
on the cheating probability of trustees. This statement is
unversally valid for both possible payment models and fol-
lowing both trustee/trustor relationships. As soon as we
use the modified Double Auction protocol, which has been
proposed in this paper, the impact of AV ALANCHEdec
renders the system more trustworthy and fairness between
agents can be ensured.
If we consider this modification again in detail, we can no-
tice that through the additional confirmation an additional
decision point for SCs and SPs has been introduced. For
these participants this additional decision point leads to the
possibility to decide based on trust and reputation infor-
mation. In terms of the introduced reputation roles, the
trustors become Beneficiary of the reputation system, such
that the reputation role overlapping determines a working
system.
In order to close the section on the Demonstration and Eval-
uation of the modified protocol combined with the decentral-
ized reputation model AV ALANCHEdec, we are going to
review the deducted requirements.
R 0 Trusting relationship between Sellers and Buyers: The
proposed mechanism adresses the trust relationship
between the group of sellers (SPs) and buyers (SCs).
This fact becomes obvious when changing the behaviour
regarding the honesty of agents during the evaluation
step. In both payment models, cheating trustees are
detected and indirectly excluded. Further, the modi-
fied protocol is still denoted as Double Auction proto-
col, such as both groups, sellers and buyers, are bid-
ding on services or demand within the same protocol.
R 1 The trustor is able to use its reputation information:
With the modification of the protocol an additional
decision point has been added. All participants can
now decide if they accept the corresponding opponent.
Through this additional possibility the agents are not
confronted with an anonymous amount of agents. In-
stead they are already clearly allocated to a specific
partner. Now they are able to use trust and repu-
tation information to make the decision whether to
confirm the matching or not. In terms of the reputa-
tional roles, SCs and SPs are now Beneficiaries of the
reputation system.
R 2 Mechanism that covers both payment models: Such as
for both sides, buyer and seller, this additional decision
point has been introduced, the protocol is still a sym-
metric one. The fact that the protocol works well with
both models could be shown within the evaluation.
R 3 Decision on acceptance must not depend on price in-
formation: This requirement can also be denoted as
fulfilled. The “Ask-if-opponent-is-Ok” message does
not include any price information. Instead it includes
the name of the opponent, such that the agent is able
to decide based for example on the opponent’s past
behaviour. The price information (in our simulation
the (M+1)st price) is conveyed with the “Sold” mes-
sage after both partners have confirmed the matching.
This split into two steps avoids an influence of strategic
economic behaviour at this point.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The paper identified trusting problems between autonomous
services in the IoS vision. The IoS envisions a service ecosys-
tem where services are traded without human interactions
and even beyond company boundaries. The conflicting in-
terests between participants lead to strategic behaviour of
single actors.
In literature, trust and reputation models are proposed to
set incentives to act honestly. But when using Double Auc-
tions to match buyers and sellers, these trust and reputa-
tion models fail to close this “trusting gap”. A theoretical
investigation of the problem has led to the idea to introduce
additional decision points. A modified Double Auction pro-
tocol fulfils the deducted requirements. Simulation experi-
ments show that the usage of this modified protocol leads
to increased trustworthiness for the participants. Conclud-
ing, the paper shows that it is possible to close the trusting
gap in Double Auction Markets as soon as the protocol is
modified as proposed. With a traditional Double Auction
protocol, closing this trusting gap is not possible.
Future work should focus on the independence of the pro-
posed mechanism from the used trust and reputation model.
Even if first investigations have been positive, this ques-
tion needs further investigations in future. Especially side-
effects between Double Auction configurations and reputa-
tion model configurations should be investigated. Further, a
detailed economic investigation of common Double Auction
requirements, like truthful bidding is still to be done.
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